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Despite the remarkable problems encountered by 
classificatory treatments self-referential proposi-
tions, virtually all 'solutions' proposed to the para-
doxes generated by these prepositions consist, as Andre 
Glucksmann has put it, "either in ruling out such prop-
ositions as nonsenses, absurdities, or in accepting 
them while making a hierarchical distinction." 1 
Clearly, the ideal solution to paradoxes of self-
reference would involve a) prevention of regeneration 
of the paradoxes at a level above that of the original 
occurrence, b) delimitation of clear criteria for the 
solution based upon arguments drawn from principles 
beyond those directly related to the paradoxes them-
selves (e.g., in the case of hierarchical solutions, a 
statement of and argument for conditions for hierarchi-
cal distinctions, beyond a mere ad hoc elimination of 
the paradoxical cases). Karl Popper has argued, quite 
cogently, that making a paradoxical self-reference 
meaningless merely regenerates the paradox at another 
level, 1 and Hans Regne11 has pointed out that generally 
"the theory of the object-language and the meta-
language does not state the ' necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the appearance of the antinomies. Nor 
does it make evident why these antinomies sometimes, 
but not always, appear when the distinction between 
object-language and meta-language is ignored."' On the 
other hand, many solutions which seem to work require 
sacrifices (such as that of substitutiv!ty of identi-
cals) which most of us v/ould be unwilling to make, as 
Fitch has noted.* 
These problems, I believe, stem from asking the 
wrong sorts of questions about self-referential prop-
ositions--specifically, 'Might such propositions be 
classified as true or false?' rather than 'Under what 
conditions might such propositions really be true or 
false?' It seems to me just as odd to turn to formal 
logic to decide if 'This sentence is true' is true, as 
it would to decide if "The cat is on the mat" is true 
(or if "'The cat is on the mat' is true" is true). 
Formal logic, Karl Popper has emphasized, deals with 
"the transmission of truth and the retransmission of 
falsity"' from proposition to proposition; it does not 
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deal with the actual truth or falsity of propositions 
themselves. This is not to say, of course, that the 
delimitation of what 'objects' may be 'mapped onto 
T,F ', the 'circumscription' of 'truth- and falsity-
predicable objects' is irrelevant to formal logic, but 
merely that formal logic by itself and as formal cannot 
determine whether or not certain states of affairs ob-
tain in the world—no amount of logical analysis will 
tell us if the cat is, in fact, on the mat, though it 
may tell us what else must be the case if the cat is on 
the mat, and what else must be the case if the cat is 
not so situated.' Thus formal logic does not, or 
should not, ask "Is 'This sentence is false' true or 
false?" but "If 'This sentence is false' is true, what 
follows, and if false, what follows?" The answer to 
this latter, hypothetical question, mistaken for an an-
swer to the former, factual question, has given rise to 
the notion that assertions such as 'This sentence is 
false' are paradoxical. In fact, formal logic says 
nothing at all about any actual paradoxes resulting 
from the truth or falsity of such assertions, but only 
something about the paradoxes which would be generated 
if such assertions were either true or false. 
To decide if an assertion is true or false we must 
begin by constructing the conditions under which such 
an assertion would be true, conditions defined by that 
assertion, 7 and then proceed to see if these conditions 
obtain in the world. (We should never ask ourselves if 
an assertion is true without having first fully deter-
mined under what conditions it would be true.) 
Suppose, for example, that we construe the truth-
conditions for "This sentence is false" and discover 
that they do (or do not) obtain, then the laws of logic 
will show us an actual (and not merely hypothetical) 
paradox. If, on the other hand, we find that these 
truth-conditions are not fully construable, as they are 
not fully defined, then no actual paradox can result, 
for the proposition cannot be true or false in the 
first place, there being no determinate truth-
conditions which may be said to obtain in the world or 
not obtain. This may be clearer with another example. 
Let us suppose that we wish to determine the truth or 
falsity of 'He has a big nose', and let us suppose fur-
ther that we have determined with context-appropriate 
accuracy what will constitute bigness with regard to 
noses. Let us suppose finally that the speaker (a 
psychotic?) literally has no one in mind when asserting 
'He has a big nose' (and furthermore does not mean 
'Someone has a big nose'). In this case the proposi-
tion does not fully define truth-conditions and is thus 
neither true nor false, as there are no determinate 
conditions which may be said to obtain or not obtain in 
the world and make that proposition true or false. It 
is my. contention that 'undecidable' and 'paradoxical' 
self-referential propositions similarly do not fully 
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define truth-conditions, therefore can be neither true 
nor false, and therefore, cannot be paradoxical (i.e. 
both true and false) or undecidable (i.e. equally as-
sertable as true or false and, therefore, again, both 
true and false). In other words, self-referential 
assertions lack a truth-value which might be transmit-
ted or re-transmitted by the laws of logic and thereby 
generate paradoxes. 
A necessary condition for a proposition to have a 
truth-value is, as we have seen, its having fully 
determinate truth-conditions, and this entails that all 
indexical elements in such propositions have definite 
referents. Given an assertion such as 'He has a big 
nose', the reference of 'he' must be definite (i.e. 
there must be such a reference) if the proposition is 
to be true or false, if it is to have truth-conditions 
which may or may not obtain in the world. When an as-
sertion itself is the referent of an index and the 
metalinguistic assertion asserts the truth or falsity 
of the object-sentence, the same definiteness of ref-
erence must obtain in that object-sentence if the meta-
linguistic assertion is to be true. Let us take, for 
example, 'This sentence is true', where the sentence 
referred to is 'He has a big nose'; if the 'he' of the 
object sentence is indeterminate, then the metalingu-
istic assertion cannot be true; if on the other hand, 
it is determinate, then the metalinguistic assertion 
may be true or may not. In any case, the metalingu-
istic assertion itself has determinate truth-conditions 
which are unaffected by the indefiniteness of its 
object-sentence's truth-conditions—the former is true, 
simply, if 'He has a big nose' defines truth-conditions 
which obtain in the world. Similarly, if yet a third 
assertion were made concerning the truth of the first 
metalinguistic assertion (i.e. 'This sentence is true' 
referring to 'This sentence is true' referring to 'He 
has a big nose'), its truth-conditions would also be 
fully definite. 
But let us take an assertion which is considered 
the same as its object sentence and, thus, having the 
same truth-conditions; clearly, if the truth-conditions 
of the latter are indeterminate, those of the former 
are indetermiate by substitutiv!ty of identicals. Let 
us take, for example, 'This sentence is true', where 
the 'this sentence' is meant to refer to 'This sentence 
is true', which is identified with the metalinguistic 
'This sentence is true' and which, thus, itself refers 
to 'This sentence is true', and so on. The first ref-
erent includes an indexical element, the referent of 
which includes an indexical element, the referent of 
which includes an indexical element, and so on in-
finitely. Thus, due to metalinguistic-sentence/object-
sentence identity, each metalinguisitic sentence is 
contingent for the definiteness of its truth-conditions 
upon the definiteness of the truth-conditions of its 
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object-sentence, but each object-sentence is itself a 
metalinguistic sentence, and thus is itself contingent 
in precisely the same fashion, due to the infinite gen-
eration of mutually identified indices. (An attempt to 
write out this sentence, in the form 'It is true that 
x', for x = it is true that x, would begin 'It is true 
that it is true that it is true that . . .' and contin-
ue thus indefinitely; in the form 'This sentence is 
true', such an attempt would begin with an infinite 
series of quotation marks.') Thus assertions of this 
form (i.e. self-referential assertions of a certain 
type) do not completely define truth-conditions, and 
are, therefore, neither true nor false, as their index-
ical elements are infinitely self-generating. (We 
should note here that such infinite self-generation 
cannot be avoided by circumlocutions of the form 'This 
sentence-token which I am now uttering is true' as 
sentence-tokens are not the sort of thing that can be 
true—they may be loud or short or garbled, but not 
true.) 
Thus we conclude that 'This sentence does not have 
fully determinate truth-conditions' is true when the 
sentence referred to is the self-referential 'This sen-
tence is true'. The truth-conditions for the first 
sentence are clearly determinate; it is true if the 
sentence to which it refers infinitely regenerates an 
indeterminate element in the definition of its truth-
conditions. This is equally true if the sentence to 
which it refers is 'This sentence does not have fully 
determinate truth-conditions', if this is considered a 
separate sentence with different truth-conditions. On 
the other hand, if 'This sentence does not fully deter-
mine truth-conditions' is meant to refer to a sentence 
with which it is identified and, hence, to a sentence 
with identical truth-conditions, then the definition of 
the truth-conditions of the metalinguistic sentence is 
contingent upon the definiteness of the truth-con-
ditions of the object-sentence, in the manner of the a-
bove examples, and, hence, its truth-conditions rest 
indefinite. 
It is important to note that it does not follow 
from this argument that every self-referential prop-
osition lacks fully definite truth-conditions, or, ra-
ther, that every self-referential assertion necessarily 
lacks definiteness in certain particulars claimed in 
that assertion true of the world. 'This sentence is 
being used as an example', for example, is fully defin-
ite in all particulars claimed true of the world and 
is, indeed, true. However, in assertions such as this, 
only a partial identification between metalinguistic 
sentence and object-sentence occurs; the metalinguistic 
assertion 'This sentence is being used as an example' 
is identified with its object-assertion only in its 
function as example, in the aspect relevant to the pre-
dication, and not in its truth-conditions. The truth-
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conditions of the object-assertion are not even pos-
ited, one might say, in the metalinguistic assertion, 
for the truth-conditions of the former are entirely 
irrelevant to the truth-claims of the latter (i.e. the 
determination of the truth-conditions of a sentence 
does not even enter into the determination of whether 
or not that sentence is functioning as an example) and 
would not, therefore, be included in the truth-
conditions of the latter, either as identified 
therewith or as differentiated therefrom. Thus it is 
only those self-referential assertions, the truth-
claims of which include in some way the truth-condi-
tions of their object-senctences, that is, self-ref-
erential assertions concerning truth-conditions (either 
directly or through assertions of truth or falsity), 
which will be identified in their truth-conditions with 
their object-sentences and thereby rest indefinite in 
those very truth-conditions, due to the unending con-
tingency of the latter on infinitely generated object-
sentences. 
Let us not consider assertions of the form , M p ' 
yields a falsehood when appended to a quotation of 
itself", where p is a predicate lacking an argument 
(e.g. 'is a string of German phonemes'). The truth or 
falsity of propositions such as this is contingent upon 
the definiteness of the truth-conditions of the sen-
tence "'p' p" (e.g. "'Is a string of German phonemes' 
is a string of German phonemes") gener«.red from the em-
bedded predicate, the non-obtaining of which in the 
world forms the truth-conditions for that original as-
sertion, unless those sentences are identified. Let us 
take an assertion of this form which Quine considers a 
genuine antinomy, '"Yields a falsehood when appended to 
a quotation of itself' yields a falsehood when appended 
to a quotation of itself."* The "'p' p"-form assertion 
generated by this assertion may be identified with the 
generating assertion or not. If it is identified, then 
the truth-conditions are identical and the definiteness 
of the generating assertion is contingent upon the 
definiteness of the generated sentence. However, the 
truth-conditions of the first generated assertion in-
volve another generated "'p' p"-form sentence with 
which it must be identical (if it is to be taken as 
truly identical to the first generating sentence) and 
thus upon the truth-conditions of which its own truth-
conditions are contingent. This contingency of gener-
ating sentence truth-conditions on generated sentence 
truth-conditions is infinitely extended through endless 
generation of "'p' p"-form sentences. Thus, again, no 
actual paradox is generated as the assertion infinitely 
regenerates an indeterminate element and thereby fails 
to fully define truth-conditions. 
Russell's paradox, as a problem of natural seman-
tics, allows a similar, if somewhat more complex, 
solution. Let us take the paradox under the form 'The 
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description of all descriptions which are not included 
in their own extensions is included in its own exten-
sion. ' Obviously we have here a question of inclusion 
or non-inclusion of this very description in a certain 
set, and for any description to be included in this set 
it must not apply to itself, which is to say, it must 
not be included in the set or extension which it itself 
defines. Thus we have two criteria which any object 
must fulfill to be included in the set in question: 1) 
the object must be a description and 2) it must not ap-
ply to itself. Thus, clearly, 'large-nosed bipeds' 
would be included and 'descriptions in English' would 
not. It is equally clear that descriptions such as 
'descriptions of a particular sort', when spoken by our 
psychotic, who has no particular sort in mind, cannot 
be said to be included or not included; the assertion 
"'Descriptions of a particular sort' is a description 
of that sort" is not fully definite. Mow amongst the 
set of all descriptions we find 'descriptions which are 
not included in their own extensions', which, as a 
description, fulfills the first condition; however, its 
own extension, which must be definite as to its own in-
clusion or non-inclusion if it is to be taken as in-
cluded or non-included in the original set, is defined 
by precisely those criteria which define the original 
set, with which set it is, indeed, identical. Thus the 
definition of the first set with regard to its own 
description is contingent upon the definition of this 
second set with regard to its own description, but it 
should be clear that this second definition is cont-
ingent upon yet a third, and so on infinitely, with all 
sets and all definitions identical and indefinite, 
leaving 'The description of all descriptions which are 
not included in their own extensions' indefinite at 
precisely the point at which it would define the condi-
tions for the truth or falsity of 'The description of 
all descriptions which are not included in their own 
extensions is included in its own extension.' 
It may be objected here, following Kripke, that it 
makes no difference if we show single-sentence self-
references to be non-paradoxical, as paradoxes might be 
generated by sentence pairs. Let us take the following 
pair 1 0: A) 'B' is true. B) 'A' is false. It may seem 
that sentence A, for example, has fully definite truth-
conditions as it is clearly not identified with its 
object-sentence (i.e., clearly, '"B'is true"^"'A' is 
false"); however, it ia identified with the object-
sentence of its object-sentence and, just as there is 
an element of indeterminacy in the original metalin-
guistic sentence, there is in this second object-
sentence such an element of indeterminacy, which must 
ultimately be determinate if the truth-conditions of 
the metalinguistic sentence are to be fully determin-
ate, for the determinacy of the truth-conditions of the 
first sentence is contingent upon the determinacy of 
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the truth-conditions of this third sentence. However, 
the determinacy of the truth-conditions of this third 
sentence is itself contingent upon the determinacy of 
the truth-conditions of the object-sentence of its 
object-sentence, that is, of some fifth sentence, it-
self, in turn, contingent, and so on infinitely. 
Clearly, the same holds for sentence B as well and, 
hence, neither is fully definite in its truth-
conditions. 
Related to this is the case of universally quanti-
fied assertions about assertions, which gives rise to 
another 'paradox', the "paradox of grounding in sem-
antics." 1 1 Obviously enough, an assertion of (natural) 
semantics of the form 'All sentences are x' necessarily 
generates the observation sentence "'All sentences are 
x' is x." It does not follow from this, however, that 
universally quantified assertions of semantics are 
necessarily undecidable or paradoxical; indeed, it does 
not even follow that such assertions lack truth-value. 
First of all, if there is some other sentence 'p* such 
that "'p' is x" is false, then 'All sentences are x' is 
itself false. For example, the sentence 'All sentences 
are false' is not paradoxical, or lacking truth-value; 
it is simply false. 1* Furthermore, 'is x' may not 
concern the truth-conditions of embedded sentences 
whatsoever. For example, 'All sentences are composed 
of universal semantic units' will generate the observa-
tion sentence "'All sentences are composed of universal 
semantic units' is composed of universal semantic 
units", but the truth-conditions cf the embedded 
sentence are irrelevant to the truth o: falsity of this 
observation sentence. For any universally quantified 
assertion about assertions to even s-jsm paradoxical, 
its predicate must concern the truth-conditions of all 
embedded sentences of all observation sentences and it 
itself must be definitely unfalsified by all assertions 
excepting itself. However, only predicates of truth-
value fulfill the first condition and 'All sentences 
are true', 'All sentences are false' (as we have noted) 
and even 'All sentences are either true or false' or 
'All sentences fully define truth-conditions' are 
false, and therefore fail to fulfill the second condi-
tion (while assertions such as 'All sentences the 
truth-conditions of which obtain in the world are true' 
or 'All and only sentences with determinate truth-
conditions are either true or false' are definitional 
and thereby have no observation sentences and no truth-
conditions, definite or not). 
Thus natural semantics is by no means a necessarily 
paradoxical undertaking; indeed there are not even any 
universally quantified assertions .:bout assertions 
which are non-true/non-false due to a failure to fully 
determine truth-conditions. Furthermo:e, other reputed 
paradoxes deriving from direct senttncial self-ref-
erence or from mutual reference of sentence pairs are 
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neither true nor false (an^. 
doxical) as they fail to tu_ 
ditions. Thus we see that by cart, 
truth-conditions paradoxes of self-r«_ 
eliminated without violating any of our thi.. 
criteria. 1 1 
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